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Abstract
Testing Deep Neural Network (DNN) models has become
more important than ever with the increasing usage of DNN
models in safety-critical domains such as autonomous cars.
The traditional approach of testing DNNs is to create a test
set, which is a random subset of the dataset about the prob-
lem of interest. This kind of approach is not enough for test-
ing most of the real-world scenarios since these traditional
test sets do not include corner cases, while a corner case in-
put is generally considered to introduce erroneous behaviors.
Recent works on adversarial input generation, data augmenta-
tion, and coverage-guided fuzzing (CGF) have provided new
ways to extend traditional test sets. Among those, CGF aims
to produce new test inputs by fuzzing existing ones to achieve
high coverage on a test adequacy criterion (i.e. coverage cri-
terion). Given that the subject test adequacy criterion is a
well-established one, CGF can potentially find error induc-
ing inputs for different underlying reasons. In this paper, we
propose a novel CGF solution for structural testing of DNNs.
The proposed fuzzer employs Monte Carlo Tree Search to
drive the coverage-guided search in the pursuit of achieving
high coverage. Our evaluation shows that the inputs generated
by our method result in higher coverage than the inputs pro-
duced by the previously introduced coverage-guided fuzzing
techniques.
Introduction
Given enough amount of data and processing power, training
a Deep Neural Network (DNN), also called Deep Learning,
is the most popular way for dealing with many hard com-
putational problems such as image classification (Cires¸an,
Meier, and Schmidhuber 2012), natural language process-
ing (Sutskever, Vinyals, and Le 2014) and speech recogni-
tion (Hinton et al. 2012). Impressive achievements in such
tasks raised expectations for deploying DNNs in real-world
applications, including the ones in safety-critical domains.
Examples of safety-critical applications include air traffic
control (Julian et al. 2016), medical diagnostics (Litjens et
al. 2017) and autonomous vehicles (Bojarski et al. 2016).
Despite the remarkable achievements, recent works
(Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
∗Most of the work was done when the author was in Bog˘azic¸i
University.
2015) have demonstrated that the DNNs are vulnerable to
small perturbations on seed inputs, also called adversarial
attacks. Considering the catastrophic results that can emerge
from erroneous behavior in safety-critical systems, DNNs
must be characterized by a high degree of dependability be-
fore being deployed in safety-critical systems. Furthermore,
it is also suggested that DNN-based systems should be al-
lowed for use in the public domain only after presenting high
levels of trustworthiness (Burton, Gauerhof, and Heinze-
mann 2017).
Testing is the primary practice for analyzing and evalu-
ating the quality of a software system (Jorgensen 2013). It
helps in reducing the risk by finding and eliminating erro-
neous behaviors before deployment of the systems. More-
over, it provides evidence for the required levels of safety
of the subject system. One of the most fundamental testing
concepts is defining a coverage criterion, also called a test
adequacy criterion, for a given test set. A coverage criterion
divides the input space into equivalence classes and is sat-
isfied if there exists at least one input for each equivalence
class in the given test set. Having a test set that is satisfying a
coverage criterion provides a degree of dependability to the
system under test.
Recent research in the DNN testing area introduces new
DNN-specific coverage criteria such as statement coverage
inspired neuron coverage (Pei et al. 2017) and its vari-
ants (Ma et al. 2018), MC/DC-inspired criteria (Seshia et
al. 2018) or other novel criteria such as surprise adequacy
(Kim, Feldt, and Yoo 2019). Previous works (Pei et al. 2017;
Ma et al. 2018; Seshia et al. 2018; Kim, Feldt, and Yoo
2019), and future studies on coverage criteria for DNNs
could be useful for exposing the defects in DNNs, finding
adversarial examples, or forming diverse test sets. On the
other hand, satisfying a coverage criterion or at least achiev-
ing a high coverage measurement can be difficult with-
out a structured method. Existing works (Xie et al. 2018;
Odena and Goodfellow 2018) leverage coverage guided
fuzzing (CGF) to achieve high coverage. However, both of
these works fuzz inputs randomly. Therefore, their effective-
ness is limited, as shown in our experiments.
In this work, we introduce DeepSmartFuzzer, a novel cov-
erage guided fuzzer, for achieving high coverage in DNNs
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for all existing criteria in the literature. Ultimately, our goal
is to help practitioners to extend their test sets with new
inputs so that more cases are covered. We leverage Monte
Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) (Bouzy and Helmstetter 2004;
Chaslot et al. 2008), a search algorithm for decision pro-
cesses, in achieving this goal. In our method, given an input,
MCTS aims to pick a series of mutations that would result
in the best coverage increase.
Contributions of this work are as follows:
• We introduce a novel advanced coverage guided fuzzing
technique for testing DNNs, that is designed to work with
every coverage metric.
• We show the effectiveness of our method on the most pop-
ular coverage criteria and DNNs with changing complex-
ity that are trained on various well-known datasets.
• We compare our method with existing coverage guided
fuzzing methods in the literature in terms of various met-
rics.
• We also show that some of the inputs generated by our
method are adversarial examples.
Related Work
Coverage-Guided Fuzzing in Software Fuzzing is a
widely used technique for exposing defects in software.
Coverage-guided grey-box fuzzing tools, such as AFL and
libFuzzer, have been quite successful in detecting thousands
of bugs in many software systems.
Testing Deep Neural Networks Several DNN testing
techniques have been developed in the literature recently.
Among those, there exist works targeting coverage crite-
ria for DNNs. For example, DeepXplore (Pei et al. 2017)
proposed neuron coverage (analogous to statement cover-
age in software). DeepGauge (Ma et al. 2018) proposed a
set of fine-grained test coverage criteria. DeepCT (Ma et
al. 2019) introduced a combinatorial coverage metric for
DNNs. Sun et al. (2018b) presented coverage criteria in-
spired by MC/DC criteria in software. Kim, Feldt, and Yoo
(2019) proposed surprise adequacy criteria based on the
amount of surprise caused by the inputs on the neuron ac-
tivation values.
Li et al. (2019) pointed out the limitation of existing struc-
tural coverage criteria for neural networks.
DLFuzz (Guo et al. 2018) introduced the first differen-
tial fuzzing framework for deep learning systems. Sun et
al. (2018a) proposed the first concolic testing approach for
DNNs. DeepCheck (Gopinath et al. 2018) tests neural net-
works based on symbolic execution. DeepTest (Tian et al.
2018) and DeepRoad (Zhang et al. 2018) proposed testing
tools for autonomous driving systems. For more studies on
testing neural networks, we refer to the work of Zhang et al.
(2019) that surveys testing of machine learning systems.
We now discuss the studies that are close to ours. Tensor-
Fuzz (Odena and Goodfellow 2018) proposed the first CGF
for neural networks that aims to increase a novel coverage
metric. DeepHunter (Xie et al. 2018) is another work ex-
ploring CGF for DNNs by leveraging techniques from soft-
ware fuzzing, such as power scheduling. Our work is dis-
tinguished from TensorFuzz and DeepHunter since we use
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) for fuzzing while they do
random fuzzing. Moreover, we apply mutations to small re-
gions of a given input, while they apply the mutation to the
whole input. Wicker, Huang, and Kwiatkowska (2018) also
use MCTS for testing DNNs. Our work has several differ-
ences from the work of (Wicker, Huang, and Kwiatkowska
2018). First, their objective is to find the nearest adversarial
example, while our objective is to increase a given coverage
criterion. Second, while they use feature extraction such as
SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) (Lowe 2004) to
ease the selection of pixels to be mutated, we do not need
feature extraction because of our formulation of the prob-
lem. Third, our method applies image transformations such
as brightness change, contrast change, and blur to the images
while their approach is based on pixel-level mutations.
Adversarial Deep Learning Szegedy et al. (2013) first
discovered the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial attacks.
Since then, multiple white-box and black-box adversarial
attacks have been proposed. The most popular white-box
attacks include FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015), BIM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016) ,
DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016),
JSMA (Papernot et al. 2016), PGD (Madry et al. 2017) and
C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017).
Attacking to a DNN in a black-box manner is harder
than white-box. There exist black-box attacks based on
transferability (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016;
Papernot et al. 2017), gradient estimation (Chen et al. 2018;
Bhagoji et al. 2018) and local-search (Narodytska and Ka-
siviswanathan 2017) in the literature.
Background
Coverage Criterion
A coverage criterion is used to measure what percent of the
potential behaviors could be tested by a given set of inputs.
For this purpose, a coverage criterion divides the input space
for a given system into equivalence classes and calculates
how many of the equivalence classes have at least one in-
stance input in a given set of inputs. When an equivalence
class has at least one instance input in a given set of inputs,
the equivalence class is said to be covered. Thus, a cover-
age criterion calculates how many of its equivalence classes
are covered by a set of inputs. If a coverage criterion prop-
erly divides the input space for a given system, covering all
equivalence classes corresponds to having at least one test
sample triggering different behaviors so that all behaviors
could be tested.
Coverage Guided Fuzzing
A Coverage Guided Fuzzer (CGF) performs systematic mu-
tations on inputs and produces new test inputs to increase the
number of covered cases for a target coverage metric. A typ-
ical CGF process starts with selecting a seed input from the
seed pool, then continues with mutating the selected seed a
certain number of times. After that, the program under test
is run with the mutated seed. If a mutated seed creates an
increase in the number of covered cases, CGF keeps the mu-
tated seed in the seed pool. In the meantime, CGF can also
keep track of details of execution, such as execution paths
and crash reports so that they could be reported if need.
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
Monte Carlo Tree Search (Bouzy and Helmstetter 2004;
Chaslot et al. 2008) is a search algorithm for decision pro-
cesses such as game play. It uses game trees to represent
a game. Each node of the game tree represents a particular
state in the game. On taking an action, one makes a transi-
tion from a node to one of its children. MCTS algorithm is
used to pick the most promising action on an arbitrary state
of a game. Ultimately, the objective is to find the best path
(i.e. best sequence of actions) to follow to win the game.
MCTS process can be broken down into the following
four steps: Selection: Starting from the root nodeR, succes-
sively select child nodes according to their potentials until a
leaf node L is reached. The potential of each child node is
calculated by using UCT (Upper Confidence Bound applied
to Trees) (Kocsis and Szepesva´ri 2006; Chaslot et al. 2008).
UCT is defined as v+e×
√
lnN
n where v refers to the value
of the node, n is the visit count of the node, and N is the
visit count for the parent of the node. e is a hyperparameter
determining exploration-exploitation trade-off. Expansion:
Unless L is a terminal node (i.e. win/loss/draw), create at
least one child node C (i.e. any valid moves from node L)
and pick one of them. Simulation: play the game from node
C by picking moves randomly until reaching a terminal con-
dition. Backpropagation: propagates back the result of the
play to update values associated with the nodes on the path
from C to R. The path containing the nodes with the high-
est values in each layer would be the optimal strategy in the
game.
For practical reasons, after applying the MCTS process on
root R for a while, it is useful to pick a new root R′ from the
child nodes of the current root R and continue the MCTS
process on the new root R′ such that the MCTS gets one
level below and continues searching on a subtree.
Method: DeepSmartFuzzer
Main Idea
The core idea of our approach is to make use of reward-
guided exploration and exploitation, in other words rein-
forcement learning, to extend the test set by mutating inputs
in a smarter way so that to achieve a higher coverage score.
In reward-guided process, selected mutations are evaluated
with the coverage changes they induce. In this way, our ap-
proach is able follow the steps that result in coverage in-
crease.
Notations
Let T = {[X1, X2, ...], [Y1, Y2, ...]} be a test set where
(Xi, Yi) is an input-output pair of the ith test sample. Let
I be a set of inputs called a batch. Let I ′, I ′′, ..., I (n) be
a sequence of mutated batches of the original batch I such
that:
I IM(r
′,m′)−−−−−−−→ I ′ IM(r
′′,m′′)−−−−−−−−→ I ′′... IM(r
(n),m(n))−−−−−−−−→ I (n) (1)
where IM(r(n),m(n)) is the nth input mutator, r(n) and m(n)
are the region and mutation indexes, respectively. Further-
more, let Ibest ∈ {I ′, I ′′, ...} be the best batch, which is the
one that creates the greatest amount of coverage increase.
Figure 1: Workflow of DeepSmartFuzzer for an iteration
Overview
DeepSmartFuzzer is a MCTS-driven coverage-guided
fuzzer for DNNs. It can be classified as a grey-box testing
method since it uses coverage information which is related
to internal states of a DNN model. The method is designed
to generate inputs that increase the current level of cover-
age formed by the initial test set. It is composed of input
chooser, coverage criterion, input mutator, and mutation se-
lector, which is the most important part. The coverage crite-
rion is a hyperparameter for our method. For each iteration,
the input chooser chooses a batch, which is a set of inputs I.
After that, the mutation selector determines which mutation
(r′,m′) to be applied to the inputs. The batch I and selected
mutation (r′,m′) then goes to input mutator which applies
the selected mutation to the batch of inputs so that the mu-
tated inputs I ′ are formed (I IM(r
′,m′)−−−−−−−→ I ′). The mutated
inputs are then given to a coverage criterion to calculate the
coverage of the mutated inputs union the test set. The cov-
erage and mutated inputs are given to the mutation selector
such that it could make use of the coverage and continue
working with I ′ so that new mutated inputs I ′′ are gener-
ated (I ′ IM(r
′′,m′′)−−−−−−−−→ I ′′). This process continues until a
termination condition such as exploration limit or mutation
limit is reached. The best set of mutated inputs Ibest is stored
and updated in the meantime. If there is an increase in cov-
erage because of the mutated inputs Ibest, they are added to
the test set. This concludes the iteration for the batch I. We
continue iterating with different batches until a termination
condition such as a target number of new inputs or timeout is
reached. The workflow of the proposed method is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Input Chooser
We use two types of input chooser for selecting inputs to
make mutations on. These are random input chooser and
clustered random input chooser. The random input chooser
randomly samples a batch of inputs from the uniform ran-
dom distribution. The clustered random input chooser aims
to sample similar inputs together. It applies an off-the-shelf
clustering algorithm. After clustering, it selects a random
cluster using the uniform random distribution. Finally, it
samples a random batch of inputs from the selected clus-
ter. We use sampling without replacement to avoid multiple
same inputs in a batch since we apply the same mutations to
all inputs in the batch. In this work, we use k-means cluster-
ing as the clustering algorithm.
Mutation Selector
The mutation selector takes a batch of inputs and sequen-
tially selects parameters region index r and mutation in-
dex m. The selected mutations are sequentially applied to
the selected regions by the input mutator and a sequence of
mutated batches I ′, I ′′, ..., I (n-1), I (n) is generated. Note that
I (n) contains all the mutations up to that point.
Modelling the mutation selection as a two-player game
Our proposed mutation selector is a two-player game such
that Player I selects the region to be mutated, and Player II
selects the mutation to be made on the chosen region. Since
regions and mutations are enumerated, these are just inte-
ger selection problems. The game continues as Players I and
II play iteratively so that multiple local mutations could be
applied.
Region selection and mutation selection are considered as
separate actions. We call a tuple of actions taken by Players
I and II together as a complete action (r,m).
Reward A naive reward for our problem is the coverage
increase for each action. We use this reward to guide the
search for mutations. In this study, coverage increase corre-
sponds to the difference between the coverage led by current
state of the test set and the coverage obtained by adding a
new batch to the test set. The purpose of the mutation se-
lector is to find the best mutations that could result in the
greatest amount of coverage increase.
End of the game In order to avoid creating unrealistic in-
puts, we put some constraints to limit the mutations. Gener-
ally, Lp norms are used for this purpose. These are defined
as ||X ′i −Xi||p <  where X ′i is the mutated input such that
the distance between mutated inputs and original inputs are
limited. In general form, let d(X ′i, Xi) be a distance metric,
the game is over when d(X ′i, Xi) <  constraint is violated,
where d and  are hyperparameters.
Searching We use Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) in
order to search the game tree for the best mutations. The
nodes in our game tree correspond to region and mutation
selections. We continuously update the batch of inputs Ibest
that creates the best coverage increase so that the batch is
added to the test set when our MCTS is finished. Figure 3
shows the steps of our MCTS where edges on odd levels of
the game tree correspond to region selections, and edges on
even levels of the game tree correspond to mutation selec-
tions.
Input Mutator
The input mutator mutates the input according to the region
index and mutation index selected by the mutation selec-
tor. The availability of so many mutations could potentially
harden the job of Mutation Selector. Therefore, by address-
ing that problem, we come up with a general input mutator
for images. It divides an image into local regions and pro-
vides general image mutations as mutation options for each
region. These general mutations include, but are not limited
to, brightness change, contrast change, and blur. When a re-
gion r and a mutation m are selected, it applies the selected
mutation to the selected region. The number of regions and
the set of available mutations for regions are hyperparame-
ters for the input mutator. With appropriate settings, we can
obtain either a pixel-level mutator or an image-level muta-
tor or something in-between, which we think is the best for
practical reasons. We enumerate the regions and mutations
so that the mutation selector identifies them by indexes. Fig-
ure 2 shows an example for the division of input into regions.
Our proposed input mutator induces a bias towards locality
since it applies mutations to regions of an image. Therefore,
it is a natural fit for image problems and convolutional neu-
ral networks.
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Figure 2: Regions for an example input
Algorithm
We describe our method in Algorithm 1. The while loop in
line 2 refers to iterating until a termination condition (tc0)
that is a timeout or reaching a target number of new inputs.
In line 3, a batch of inputs I is sampled using the input
chooser. The root node R is created in line 4, and variables
to store best mutated batch Ibest are initialized in line 5. The
while loop in line 6 refers to looping until a termination con-
dition (tc1) that determines at most how many levels in the
search tree the MCTS can go down. Next, the while loop in
line 7 refers to iterating until a termination condition (tc2)
that determines at most how many times a MCTS node can
be explored. In line 8, MCTS Selection is made and it re-
sults in a leaf node L. Then, in line 9, MCTS Expansion is
applied and it creates a new child node C as a child of the
leaf node L. We assume our MCTS Selection and MCTS
Expansion functions mutate the original batch I according
to the game tree and store the batch corresponding to each
node as a property of the node, which is denoted as node.I.
Note that node.I is created by applying the mutations cor-
responding to the edges that are on the path from the root
Selection Expansion Simulation Backpropagation
region j region j region j
Repeat
region 1 region k
brightness
blur contrast
blur contrast
region 1 region k
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Figure 3: Scheme of a Monte-Carlo Tree Search.
Algorithm 1 Algorithmic description of our method: DeepSmartFuzzer
1: procedure DEEPSMARTFUZZER(T, Input Chooser, Coverage Criterion, tc0, tc1, tc2, tc3)
2: while not tc0 do
3: I = Input Chooser(T)
4: R = MCTS Node(I)
5: best coverage, Ibest = 0, I
6: while not tc1 do
7: while not tc2 do
8: L = MCTS Selection(R)
9: C = MCTS Expansion(L)
10: I (n-1) = C.I . I MCTS Selection and Expansion−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ I (n-1)
11: r(n),m(n) = MCTS Simulation(C)
12: I (n) = Input Mutator(I (n-1), r(n),m(n)) . I (n-1) IM(r
(n),m(n))−−−−−−−−→ I (n)
13: if not tc3 then . the game is not finished: d(I (n), I) < 
14: coverage increase = Coverage Criterion(T ∪ I (n)) - Coverage Criterion(T)
15: if coverage increase > best coverage then
16: best coverage, Ibest = coverage increase, I (n)
17: MCTS Backpropagation(C, coverage increase)
18: R = select child(R) . selects the child that has the greatest value in terms of coverage increase
19: if best coverage > 0 then
20: T = T ∪ Ibest
21: return T
node R to the given node. In line 10, the mutated batch that
is the result of MCTS Selection and Expansion is referred
as I (n-1). Then, the MCTS Simulation plays the game un-
til a complete action so that r(n) and m(n) are assigned to
a region index and a mutation index, respectively (line 11).
The input mutator then mutates the batch I (n-1) according
to a region index r(n) and a mutation index m(n) so that a
new batch I (n) is created (line 12). Termination condition
(tc3) limits distance between the mutated batch I (n) and the
original batch I. If this new batch I (n) does not violate the
termination condition (tc3), then the mutated batch I (n) is
considered as a candidate batch of test inputs (line 13-14).
In line 15, coverage increase is calculated from the differ-
ence between coverage of test set T union mutated batch
I (n) and just test set T . If this is the greatest coverage in-
crease for this batch I, the mutated batch I (n) is stored as
the best mutated batch Ibest (line 15-16). MCTS Backprop-
agation is applied from the new child node C with coverage
increase as reward (line 17). This concludes one iteration of
the while loop with tc2, and the algorithm continues looping
this way to explore the root node until tc2. When termina-
tion condition tc2 is reached, it sets the best child R′ of root
R as the new root node (line 18). The best child R′ is the
node with the greatest value, which is average coverage in-
crease (reward) found on the paths (sequences of mutations)
that contain the node. After setting a child as the new root,
an iteration of the while loop with tc1 is completed, and the
while loop continues iterating by working on the subtree of
the previous game tree. After the while loop is completely
finished, the best batch found Ibest is added to the test set if
it creates a coverage increase (line 19-20). This concludes
a complete iteration of MCTS on the batch I and the algo-
rithm continue iterating with new batches until termination
condition tc0 is reached. When it is reached, the final test set
which includes the mutated inputs found up to that point is
returned (line 21). Figure 4 illustrates the algorithm in ac-
mutation
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Figure 4: Visualization of a snapshot when our method searching the mutation space for TFC and MNIST-LeNet5 where action
columns represents the potentials (the more brighter the more potential) of each enumerated action on the search tree
tion as follows: it selects a region (action) and a mutation
(action) so that the input mutator applies the mutation to the
region, and then this process is continued repeatedly while
MCTS is searching the game tree.
Experiments1
Setup
Datasets and DL Systems We evaluate DeepSmartFuzzer
on two popular publicly available datasets namely MNIST
(LeCun 1998) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky and Hinton 2009)
(referred to as CIFAR from now on). MNIST is a handwrit-
ten digit dataset with 60000 training and 10000 testing in-
puts. Each input is a 28x28 pixel white and black image with
a class label from 0 to 9. CIFAR is a 3-channel colored im-
age dataset with 50000 training and 10000 testing samples.
Each input is a 3x32x32 image in ten different classes (e.g.,
plane, ship, car). For the MNIST dataset, we study LeNet1,
LeNet4, and LeNet5 (LeCun et al. 1998) DNN architec-
tures, which are the three well-known and popular models
in the literature. For the CIFAR dataset, we make use of
a suggested convolutional neural network (CNN) architec-
ture with proven success to some degree. The subject DNN
architectures are selected from different complexities, and
they achieve competitive accuracy in the respective test sets.
More details can be seen in Table 1.
Compared Techniques and Coverage Criteria Bench-
marks We evaluate our tool by comparing its performance
with two existing CGF frameworks for deep learning sys-
tems. The first tool, namely DeepHunter (Xie et al. 2018),
aims to achieve high coverage by randomly selecting a batch
of inputs and applying random mutations on them. Deep-
Hunter also leverages various fuzzing techniques from soft-
ware testing, such as power scheduling. However, the tool
is not publicly available. Therefore we use our implementa-
tion of DeepHunter in evaluation. The second tool, namely
1The code for our method and experiments can be found on
https://github.com/hasanferit/DeepSmartFuzzer.
Table 1: Datasets and DL Systems used in our experiments.
Dataset DL System ParametersAccuracy
MNIST LeNet1 7206 98.33%
LeNet4 69362 98.59%
LeNet5 107786 98.96%
CIFAR
20 layer CNN
with max-pooling
and dropout layers
952234 77.68%
Tensorfuzz (Odena and Goodfellow 2018), uses the guid-
ance of coverage to debug DNNs. For example, it finds nu-
merical errors and disagreements between neural networks
and quantized versions of those networks. Tensorfuzz code
is publicly available, and we integrate it into our framework.
For an unbiased evaluation of DeepSmartFuzzer, we test
our tool on various coverage criteria from the literature. We
use DeepXplore’s (Pei et al. 2017) neuron coverage (NC),
DeepGauge’s (Ma et al. 2018) k-multisection neuron cover-
age (KMN), neuron boundary coverage (NBC), strong neu-
ron activation coverage (SNAC) and Tensorfuzz’s coverage
(TFC). Neuron Coverage is defined as the ratio of neurons
whose activation value is greater than a threshold to all neu-
rons given a set of inputs. KMN, NBC, and SNAC are de-
rived from Neuron Coverage. KMN divides the space of ac-
tivation values into k sections. Given a set of inputs, it finds
the sections that the activation values of each neuron fall
into. Those sections are said to be covered. Then it calcu-
lates the ratio of the covered sections to all sections. NBC
finds the boundaries (maximum and minimum) of activation
values of each neuron given the set of training inputs. Neu-
rons whose activation values are out of boundary values are
said to cover the boundaries. The ratio of covered bound-
aries to all boundaries is the coverage value. TFC uses the
output activation vector of the penultimate layer of the DNN.
Different inputs can generate different activation vectors. It
Model - Coverage
/
CGF
MNIST
LeNet1
(NC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet1
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(TFC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(NC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet4
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(TFC)
DeepHunter 0 2.34 ± 0.03 % 35.42 ± 2.76 % 41.67 ± 4.17 % 29.00 ± 3.61 0 1.91 ± 0.04 % 13.15 ± 2.34 % 16.67 ± 0.81 % 20.00 ± 2.00
TensorFuzz 0 1.83 ± 0.23 % 0 0 0.33 ± 0.58 0 1.26 ± 0.05 % 0 0 0
DeepSmartFuzzer 0 2.91 ± 0.11 % 41.67 ± 4.77 % 42.36 ± 6.36 % 204.67 ± 8.50 1.41 ± 0.00 % 2.07 ± 0.14 % 11.50 ± 1.13 % 16.90 ± 3.07 % 64.33 ± 6.03
DeepSmartFuzzer(clustered) 0 2.88 ± 0.04 % 38.54 ± 0.00 % 39.58 ± 7.51 % 111.00 ± 14.53 1.41 ± 0.00 % 2.02 ± 0.07 % 11.50 ± 0.54 % 15.02 ± 2.15 % 53.33 ± 8.39
Table 2: Coverage increase achieved by each CGF for MNIST-LeNet1 and MNIST-LeNet4 models.
Model - Coverage
/
CGF
MNIST
LeNet1
(NC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet1
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(TFC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(NC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet4
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet4
(TFC)
DeepHunter 0* 1051.00 ± 4.00 847.00 ± 159.74* 724.67 ± 180.17* 1029.67 ± 29.48 0* 1051.00 ± 4.00 1036.00 ± 12.49 1033.67 ± 27.50 1026.67 ± 33.50
TensorFuzz 0* 1023.33 ± 1.15 0* 0* 0.33 ± 0.58* 0* 768.00 ± 0.00* 0* 0* 0*
DeepSmartFuzzer 0* 1024.00 ± 0.00 1002.67 ± 36.95 533.33 ± 73.90* 1024.00 ± 0.00 128.00 ± 0.00* 981.33 ± 73.90† 1024.00 ± 0.00† 789.33 ± 195.52* 1024.00 ± 0.00
DeepSmartFuzzer(clustered) 0* 1024.00 ± 0.00 896.00 ± 128.00* 469.33 ± 97.76* 1024.00 ± 0.00 128.00 ± 0.00* 1024.00 ± 0.00† 1024.00 ± 0.00† 725.33 ± 97.76* 1024.00 ± 0.00
Table 3: Number of new inputs produced by each CGF for MNIST-LeNet1 and MNIST-LeNet4 models. *2 hours timeout
†Extended experiments with 6 hours limit for timeout
differentiates between the activation vectors by using a dis-
tance threshold. If a given input creates an activation vector
that is distant from the previous inputs, the given input is
said to cover a new case, so the coverage is increased by
one.
Hyperparamters We set neuron activation threshold to
0.75 in NC and the number of sections k to 10000 in KMN,
respectively. For NBC and SNAC, we set as lower (upper)
bound the minimum (maximum) activation value encoun-
tered in the training set, respectively. These are the recom-
mended settings in the original studies. On the other hand,
we observed that the distance threshold used in the origi-
nal TensorFuzz study was too small for MNIST and CI-
FAR models such that every little mutation could increase
the coverage. Therefore, we tune the threshold of TFC for
LeNet1, LeNet4, LeNet5 and CIFAR CNN as 302, 132, 112
and 32, respectively.
The number of regions, the set of mutations, and termina-
tion conditions (tc1, tc2, tc3) constitute the hyperparameters
of DeepSmartFuzzer. The number of regions is selected as 9,
which corresponds to 3× 3 division of an image. The set of
mutations is selected as contrast change, brightness change,
and blur. The first termination conditions (tc1) is chosen to
limit MCTS from going down more than 8 levels deep in
the game tree. The second termination condition (tc2) lim-
its the number of iterations on each root to 25. For the last
termination condition (tc3), we are using the limitations that
DeepHunter (Xie et al. 2018) puts on the distance between
mutated and seed inputs to avoid unrealistic mutated inputs.
Results
Summary We aim to show that DeepSmartFuzzer is able
to generate good test inputs. First, we compare DeepSmart-
Fuzzer with DeepHunter and TensorFuzz by comparing the
coverage increases created by approximately 1000 new in-
puts for each method in combination with different DNN
models and coverage criteria. Experimental results show
that the inputs generated by our method result in the great-
est amount of coverage increase for all (DNN model, cov-
erage criterion) pairs except for a few. This suggests that
DeepSmartFuzzer creates better test inputs than DeepHunter
and TensorFuzz with regards to the coverage measurements.
Second, we calculate the percentage of adversarial, in or-
der words error inducing, test inputs created by our method.
The results indicate that there are many adversarial inputs,
and they constitute an important part of all generated inputs.
Therefore, we conclude that DeepSmartFuzzer is better than
the other coverage-guided fuzzers for DNNs, and it is able
to generate adversarial inputs. Figure 5 shows two mutated
MNIST and two mutated CIFAR inputs created by DeepS-
martFuzzer.
Figure 5: Example inputs generated by DeepSmartFuzzer
Comparison to DeepHunter and Tensorfuzz We focus
on the inputs generated by DeepSmartFuzzer, DeepHunter,
and Tensorfuzz. For experimental integrity, we make each
method generate approximately 1000 input samples. Only
the inputs which induce coverage increase are taken into ac-
count. We also put a time limit in order to avoid unending
cases resulting from being unable to find any coverage in-
crease for some (DNN model, coverage criteria) pairs. When
a method could not produce the target amount of inputs in
time, yet it creates some coverage increase such that it shows
more potential to be explored, the timeout limit is extended
so that they could reach 1000 inputs. This condition is not
applied to TensorFuzz since it generates inputs one by one,
and therefore, it could practically take days to reach 1000
inputs for some cases. The timeout is set to be 2 hours ini-
tially. It is then gradually increased to 6, 12, and 24 hours to
explore the full potential. Tables 2 and 4 show the amounts
of coverage increase produced by approximately 1000 gen-
erated input samples from each method with divergent set of
coverage criteria and DNN models for MNIST and CIFAR
datasets. In order to provide complete results, Tables 3 and
5 indicate exactly how many inputs are generated for each
case. All of these results are given as mean and standard de-
viation of the population resulting from running the same
experiment three times with different random seeds.
For most of the cases, DeepSmartFuzzer is better than the
other two. Especially for the case of TFC, DeepSmartFuzzer
Model - Coverage
/
CGF
MNIST
LeNet5
(NC)
MNIST
LeNet5
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet5
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet5
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet5
(TFC)
CIFAR
CNN
(NC)
CIFAR
CNN
(KMN)
CIFAR
CNN
(NBC)
CIFAR
CNN
(SNAC)
CIFAR
CNN
(TFC)
DeepHunter 0.51 ± 0.58 % 1.77 ± 0.03 % 6.23 ± 0.55 % 8.40 ± 0.66 % 19.00 ± 1.73 1.99 ± 0.19 % 0.98 ± 0.03 % 2.39 ± 0.64 % 4.48 ± 0.90 % 16.00 ± 2.65
Tensorfuzz 0.13 ± 0.22 % 0.75 ± 0.06 % 0.13 ± 0.22 % 0 1.33 ± 0.58 0.93 ± 0.15 % 0.13 ± 0.01 % 1.54 ± 0.19 % 2.92 ± 0.34 % 0
DeepSmartFuzzer 2.16 ± 0.44 % 1.99 ± 0.01 % 7.82 ± 1.06 % 9.03 ± 1.10 % 76.33 ± 5.69 3.51 ± 0.48 % 1.38 ± 0.09 % 2.39 ± 1.23 % 4.91 ± 2.51 42.33 ± 4.51
DeepSmartFuzzer(clustered) 2.29 ± 0.38 % 1.92 ± 0.08 % 7.89 ± 0.72 % 8.40 ± 1.91 % 76.00 ± 8.89 3.51 ± 0.37 % 1.33 ± 0.06 % 3.83 ± 2.66 % 8.80 ± 7.11 48.67 ± 7.02
Table 4: Coverage increase achieved by each CGF for MNIST-LeNet5 and CIFAR-CNN models.
Model - Coverage
/
CGF
MNIST
LeNet5
(NC)
MNIST
LeNet5
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet5
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet5
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet5
(TFC)
CIFAR
CNN
(NC)
CIFAR
CNN
(KMN)
CIFAR
CNN
(NBC)
CIFAR
CNN
(SNAC)
CIFAR
CNN
(TFC)
DeepHunter 86.33 ± 96.81* 1051.00 ± 4.00 1021.00 ± 10.54 1021.67 ± 19.66 1034.00 ± 17.52 1047.00 ± 6.24 1035.67 ± 13.58 1031.67 ± 12.34 1049.00 ± 10.54 1042.67 ± 5.51
Tensorfuzz 0.33 ± 0.58* 448.00 ± 0.00* 0.67 ± 1.15* 0* 1.33 ± 0.58* 7.33 ± 1.15* 192.00 ± 0.00 21.00 ± 2.65 20.67 ± 3.21 0*
DeepSmartFuzzer 362.67 ± 73.90* 1024.00 ± 0.00† 1024.00 ± 0.00† 725.33 ± 36.95* 1024.00 ± 0.00 1024.00 ± 0.00 1024.00 ± 0.00† 320.00 ± 0.00 341.33 ± 36.95 1024.00 ± 0.00
DeepSmartFuzzer(clustered) 362.67 ± 73.90* 1024.00 ± 0.00 † 1024.00 ± 0.00† 682.67 ± 36.95* 1024.00 ± 0.00 1024.00 ± 0.00 1024.00 ± 0.00† 341.33 ± 36.95 341.33 ± 36.95 1024.00 ± 0.00
Table 5: Number of new inputs produced by each CGF for MNIST-LeNet5 and CIFAR-CNN models. *2 hours timeout
†Extended experiments with 6, 12, 24 hours limits for timeout
provides a substantial improvement over DeepHunter and
TensorFuzz. This might be related to TFC being a layer-
level coverage criterion, while the others are neuron-level
coverage criteria. Our solution gets better when model com-
plexity is increased. This is suggested by the increasing per-
formance gap between our method and the others. Further-
more, DeepSmartFuzzer with clustering tends to be better
than naive DeepSmartFuzzer when the complexity of the
model is increased.
On the other hand, for a few cases, our approach fails to
provide an improvement. For example, in neuron coverage
(NC) with LeNet1 model case, we observe that all fuzzers
fail to generate any coverage-increasing input. This is be-
cause when we cannot find any reward (i.e. coverage in-
crease), our MCTS solution is similar to a random search.
However, we believe this problem can be avoided with a
well-designed reward shaping, and this is left to future work.
Also, for the case of LeNet4 in combination with NBC, Dee-
pHunter seems to be better than ours. This may indicate a
need for further hyperparameter tuning since it conflicts with
the general trend. Overall, we conclude that DeepSmart-
Fuzzer provides a significant improvement over existing
coverage-guided fuzzers for DNNs.
Model - Coverage
/
Generated Inputs
MNIST
LeNet1
(KMN)
MNIST
LeNet1
(NBC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(SNAC)
MNIST
LeNet1
(TFC)
# Adversarial 160.00 ± 22.11 59.00 ± 3.00 32.00 ± 8.54 183.67 ± 21.78
# Total 917.33 ± 73.90 1002.67 ± 36.95 533.33 ± 73.90 1024.00 ± 0.00
Percent % 17.43 ± 1.73 % 5.89 ± 0.37 % 5.94 ± 0.92 % 17.94 ± 2.13 %
Table 6: Statistics on adversarial inputs generated by DeepS-
martFuzzer on MNIST dataset.
Adversarial Input Generation We further experiment
with our proposed method in order to check how good it
is at finding error-inducing inputs, which is one of the ulti-
mate purposes of testing. The results are provided in Table
6. The percentage of adversarial inputs that are generated by
DeepSmartFuzzer is dependent on the used coverage crite-
ria as expected. DeepSmartFuzzer with KMN or TFC pro-
vides approximately 17% adversarial inputs while DeepS-
martFuzzer with NBC or SNAC provides approximately 5%
adversarial inputs. Although one may think that these per-
centages are low, we note that adversarial example genera-
tion is not the main goal of DeepSmartFuzzer and the cover-
age criteria used in this paper. Thus, we can say that DeepS-
martFuzzer is able to generate error-inducing (adversarial)
input samples.
Conclusion & Future Work
In this study, we introduce an advanced coverage guided
fuzzer for DNNs that uses Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
to explore and exploit the coverage increase patterns. We
experimentally show that our method is better than the pre-
vious coverage guided fuzzers for DNNs. Our results also
show the potential of reinforcement learning methods for
DNN testing. We use naive coverage increase as reward.
Therefore, experimentation with reward shaping and differ-
ent reinforcement learning methods for this problem are left
to future studies. We also show that an important portion of
the test inputs generated by our method is adversarial. This
suggests that our method is successful in terms of testing
DNNs. Finally, we share the code for our experiments on-
line in order to provide a base for future studies.
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